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Third, the continued imbalance in the payments of  the industrial countries 
threatens expansion of world trade in two ways. One is a recession induced by 
restrictive macroeconomic policies in the United States unmatched by expansion 
in Germany and Japan; the other is rising protectionism and increased attention to 
bilateral trade balance that limit the scope for debtor country import penetration. 
Fourth, on the import side, there may  be  an overestimate of  the structural 
reduction in Brazilian income elasticities owing to the large program of import 
substitution. Artificially low investment, despite income recovery in  1985 and 
1986, has helped to keep import demand in check. But such a pattern cannot be 
projected, nor is it consistent with sustained development. Export growth itself 
becomes dependent upon access to imports. Brazilian ability to generate large 
trade surpluses due to previous investment should not be exaggerated. 
Taken together with recent experience, these considerations suggest that 
Brazilian trade performance and policy are not settled issues. It will require a 
sustained  effort  to  assure  that  export  growth  occurs  in  a  more  regular 
fashion. It will also require careful attention to assure that import limitations 
and emphasis upon the internal market do not, in the end, worsen rather than 
improve the  balance of  payments.  In  the  last  analysis,  meaningful trade 
projections cannot be made within the context of  debt service requirements 
alone. A broader perspective, incorporating the debt as an integral part of the 
Brazilian development problem, is necessary. 
7  Epilogue: Debt and 
Development 
Thus far we have stressed the problems of macroeconomic adjustment to the 
large Brazilian external debt. Debt service has imposed new demands upon 
trade performance and upon  the public  sector. The former has responded 
better than the latter. Since 1984, record export surpluses have been attained. 
Fiscal deficits and  inflationary pressures have persisted,  however, and the 
Cruzado Plan, despite its promising start, has failed. Once again, while trade 
surpluses have recovered  to  the  $10 billion level,  inflation  exceeded 400 
percent in  1987. Instead of external and internal equilibrium being joint, the 
strong balance  of  trade  has  been  gained,  to  some extent,  at  the  cost  of 
domestic imbalance. 
But  the  debt  problem  goes  even  deeper.  It  is  rapidly  evolving  into 
the central problem  of  economic development in  the  1990s. After  almost 
a  decade  of  slower  growth  to  facilitate  adjustment  through  limited 
imports, future prospects are dimmed by low rates of investment since 1982. 352  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
24 
20 








Investment  averaged  23  percent  of  gross  product  in  1975-79  and  21.6 
percent  in  1980-82,  but  only  17.7  percent  in  1984-86.  Figure  7.1 
illustrates the  behavior of  investment and  savings shares in  GDP.  Recent 
investment rates are well  below  the  requirements necessary  for sustained 
rates  of  growth  adequate to  absorb  a  growing potential  labor  force  and 
capable of underwriting a continuing transition to political democracy. 
In this concluding chapter, we explore both this development problem and 
the adequacy of debt policy. The moratorium on interest has come to an end, 
and  a  conventional  new  money  package  was  granted  in  1988.  That 
agreement, unfortunately, did not provide a happy ending to this  story of 
Brazilian  indebtedness.  Now,  a  debt  reduction  agreement  awaits  the 










7.1  Crowding Out Investment 
At  the  heart of  the Latin  American  adjustment to the  requirements for 
continuing interest payments after 1982 has been a large export surplus and 
transfer of  resources to creditors. Although principal has been rescheduled, 
interest  payments  have  not.  Voluntary  lending  has  been  minimal,  and 
concerted arrangements have been limited. As a consequence, between 1983 
and 1987, Latin America has paid some $120 billion more in interest than it 
has financed from new borrowing. 
The experience in  Brazil  has  been  typical  for the region,  as  shown  in 
figure 7.2. Indeed, its resource transfer between 1983 and 1987 amounted to 
about $45 billion, more than its share of regional debt. The export surpluses 
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Fig. 7.1  Gross investment and savings in Brazil, 1970-86 353  Brazil/Chapter 7 
needed to effect the transfer have  averaged more  than  5 percent  of  gross 
product since 1984. The counterpart.  domestic resources have come primarily 
at the expense of  investment rather than consumption. 
Instead of reduced consumption paying the lion’s share of external interest 
in response to reduced national income, and thus a rise in the national saving 
rate, consumption has been sustained. The consequence has been high real 
interest rates that crowd out private capital formation in order to satisfy the 
equality  between uses  and  applications of  resources.  More  austere fiscal 
policy  and  greater  saving would  avert  such  an  implication.  But  political 
realities and economic behavior prevent such a solution. 
Brazil, despite relatively high levels of taxation, has not found it easy to 
increase taxes enough to raise the cash surplus required to meet its internal and 
external interest obligations while simultaneously paying for its purchases of 
goods and services. The lesson from the failure of the Cruzado Plan was the 
difficulty of  augmenting public sector financial capacity.  The government 
eventually resorted  to  increasing indirect taxes,  with  only  modest  effect. 
Larger collections and reduced outlays are a policy imperative, but they may 
be  easier to  achieve while the economy is  expanding,  rather than  during 
stagnation. Taxation has adverse effects on incentives. These effects, how- 
ever, can be offset by  the larger incomes in  a growing economy. 
High interest rates have made it possible for the public sector to sell the 
internal debt needed to finance its  borrowing requirements. But  they have 
done so by  portfolio  substitution rather than by  inducing an outpouring of 
new  saving. Theory is ambiguous about the relative weight of  income and 
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Fig. 7.2  Real resource transfers (as a share of  GDP) 354  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
there is virtually no systematic net effect. On  the other hand, high interest 
rates  tend  to  increase  the  large  component of  government expenditures 
dedicated to debt service and thereby to build in continuing high deficits. 
If  consumption is to  be  restrained, other instruments will  be  required. 
Whether by  reason of pent-up demands after earlier austerity or uncertainty 
about  the  future,  Brazilian  consumption  has  been  quite  strong  and 
unresponsive to larger foreign transfers. Saving is too small, particularly in a 
world  in  which  foreign  saving is  likely to  remain  limited  over the  next 
decade. Domestic saving will have to increase, but the more promising route 
is through higher rates of  growth rather than austerity. 
There is a medium-term vicious circle. Investment is too limited to sustain 
adequate  rates  of  growth  while  underwriting  expanding  exports  and 
permitting the transfer of technology required to remain competitive in world 
markets. Growth is driven by consumption demand and public sector deficits 
that negatively affect the balance of  payments, inflation, and real  interest 
rates.  Structural reforms have limited priority when  immediate macroeco- 
nomic disequilibrium occupies center stage. Soon, the only option is another 
dose of  stabilization and austerity. This encounters political resistance and 
fails to yield durable consequences. 
At  the heart of  this sequence is the adverse effect of  large transfers of 
resources to service the external debt. Note that the effect stressed here is not 
the  additional  short-term  problem  of  domestic  resource  reallocation  to 
tradables associated with making the export surplus possible. Because much 
of  that  burden  falls  upon  expenditure reduction  and  import  contraction, 
stabilization is usually costly. For both reasons, analyses of  capacity to pay 
debt  service based  on  projections of  imports  and  exports  are  inherently 
excessively  optimistic. They  ignore  short-term inflexibilities and  pay  no 
attention to where the counterpart real domestic resources are coming from in 
the medium term.  Large trade surpluses are not  feasible when  there is a 
continued reduction in  capital formation. There will be  neither growth nor 
assured debt service. 
7.2  The Debt/Export Ratio 
Figure 7.3 plots the debuexport ratio from 1929 to 1986. The debvexport 
ratio today is almost as high as it was in the early 1930s. A solution to the 
debt crisis and the restoration of creditworthiness would be translated into a 
reduction of the debvexport ratio. 
The basic  debt  dynamics model  focuses on  this  ratio,  which  evolves 
according to the familiar equation: 
(1) 
where: d is the ratio of  debt to exports; i*  is the average interest rate on the 
external debt; x  is the rate of growth of  exports; n is the noninterest current 
d, =  b d,-  I -  n,  -ft;  b =  ( 1 +  i*  )/(  1  +  x) 355  BrazilKhapter 7 
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Fig. 7.3  Debt/export ratio, 1929-86 
account surplus as a ratio of  exports; and f is the non-debt-creating capital 
inflows as a ratio of  exports. 
The equation highlights three main determinants of  the behavior of  the 
debt to export ratio. The first one captures the automatic element of  debt 
accumulation. As long as the international interest rate exceeds the rate of 
export growth, the current debvexport ratio exceeds the past ratio. The next 
element is the noninterest current account surplus. Other things being equal, 
the higher the noninterest current account surplus, the lower the debvexport 
ratio. The noninterest current account depends in part on domestic policies 
and in part on the external environment. The ease with which Brazil will be 
able  to  generate  a  noninterest  current  account  surplus-consistent  with 
domestic growth, moderate inflation, and high investment-is  the key issue 
in the solution of its debt problem. Finally, non-debt-creating capital inflows 
can help reduce the rate of  debt accumulation. Direct investment would be 
beneficial, while repatriation of  foreign investment and capital flight would 
create extra problems. 
Figure 7.4 shows the historical series for the Brazilian debuexport ratio, 
as well as three scenarios for the 1987-98 period. The projections start from 
the initial ratio of  4.9 in 1986. 
Scenario 1.  This  scenario is  a  pessimistic  one.  We  assume  that  the 
noninterest current account surpluses and  non-debt-creating capital inflows 
cancel each other out to equal zero throughout the period (n  + f = 0). The 
international interest rate is assumed to be 9 percent throughout the period. 356  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
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Fig. 7.4  Debuexport ratio, 1975-98 
The export growth rate is assumed to behave as erratically as in the past-its 
behavior between 1975 and  1986 is repeated year after year between  1987 
and 1998. The result is dismal. By  1998 the debvexport ratio would be equal 
to 4.9, as bad as the starting point in 1986. 
Scenario If. This scenario is more optimistic than the previous one. The 
noninterest current account surplus and the non-debt-creating capital inflows 
are assumed to be as large as 10 percent of exports. We  also assume that the 
export growth rate is kept constant and falls short of the international interest 
rate  by  1 percent.  Under  these circumstances we  would  observe a  small 
reduction of the debvexport ratio to 4.3 in  1998. 
Scenario IZZ. This scenario is overly optimistic. We  assume that every year 
the growth rate of  exports would match the international interest rate. The 
noninterest current account surplus and the non-debt-creating capital inflows 
are assumed to add up to 20 percent of exports. We  observe that 20 percent 
was the average ratio of  noninterest surpluses to exports between 1982 and 
1985, when Brazil achieved its highest trade surpluses ever. That means that 
in any year between 1987 and 1998, Brazilian imports would not exceed 80 
percent of  the  revenue from  exports  and  direct  investment.  Under  these 
circumstances, the debvexport ratio would be reduced to 2.5, just below its 
level in  1975. 
These simulations give some idea of how important noninterest surpluses 
and  nondebt  capital inflows are in order to compensate for the effects of 
large interest payments. The key problem is how to achieve those surpluses 
without sacrificing imports necessary for investment. Here, finding a reliable 
mechanism to  finance that  portion of  interest payments not  supported by 
exports will play a central role in solving the debt problem. 357  BraziVChapter 7 
7.3  Debt Policy 
There  is  scope  for  both  international  and  internal  policy  to  improve 
present  prospects.  Reduced resource transfers require new  understandings 
with  creditors; they  will not  come about  through  spontaneous new  credit 
flows nor lower international interest rates. The conventional settlement of 
the  moratorium  did  not  resolve  the  issue.  It  provided  finance  for  1987 
interest arrears, as well as limited new loans. In  1989 these resources have 
not  even  been  available because of  a  lack  of  an  IMF agreement.  These 
packages have been the norm for other debtors, and with the same negative 
implications for investment and growth. 
The capital flows required to significantly reduce the resource transfers as 
a percentage of income are not in prospect. That was a major defect of the 
initial Baker Plan that called for annual flows of less than $13 billion. There 
is a broad consensus that such a level was too small by half, and such flows 
were never realized. Banks refused to make new commitments and continue 
to remain reluctant. 
Martin  Feldstein’s (1987) optimistic assessment of  the debt problem in 
general, and the Brazilian situation in particular, is flawed for this reason. 
His  calculations, presented in  The Economist,  for net  external borrowing 
requirements based  on a resource transfer of  2.5  percent of  product were 
seen  as  eminently  reasonable.  Yet  the  $4  billion  that  would  be  needed 
annually for the next few years is much larger than capital inflows obtained 
in any year since 1982. If there had been access to such lending, there would 
have been no moratorium, a much stronger basis for increased investment, 
and, very probably, a much more successful outcome to the Cruzado Plan. 
Brazil is apparently one of the countries capable of absorbing new loans as 
a means of adjusting to its debt overhang. Up until recently, it has not been 
afflicted by a large capital flight, as have other debtors, so there is a counterpart 
stock of real assets corresponding to external liabilities. Moreover, much of the 
investment was productively applied. As long as international interest rates are 
not larger than the growth rates of exports and of product, even modest trade 
surpluses will permit continuing reductions in debvexport and debvproduct 
ratios. Those more modest surpluses would be possible because of new credits 
and increases in the debt. In terms of figure 7.4, this would yield a favorable 
outcome intermediate between scenario I1 and 111. 
But one should also not ignore the peril of such a strategy. The problem is 
that new loans are added on top of a 1987 debt export ratio that has already 
reached a level much higher than projected or desired. Brazil begins with a 
ratio  of  4.9.  That  translates  into  considerable  short-term  vulnerability. 
Increases in  interest rates,  higher oil prices,  slower industrialized country 
economic  growth,  and  domestic  policy  mistakes  would  all  mean  larger 
borrowing  requirements  than  initially  projected.  But  there  is  a  limited 
willingness, given the level of exposure, to accept the risk of financing such 358  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
additional needs. Domestic growth rates then suffer. They are not the target 
to which  capital flows accommodate, but rather the principal variable that 
must adjust. 
In the last analysis, a policy of growing into debt by new borrowing works 
when the supply of new capital is highly elastic and the environment relatively 
stable. Neither accurately describes the present situation. Efforts to introduce 
greater certainty through interest rate capitalization or by establishing a new 
interest rate compensatory fund at the IMF have made very little headway. 
There is  continued resistance  to  assured interest capitalization.  Muddling 
through works by  avoiding a crisis at the expense of  developing countries' 
growth.  It  has  involved  too  little  additional  credit  expansion  to  permit 
countries to adjust, but too much for the taste of banks. The implications of 
another decade  of  muddling  through  are  nicely  captured by  figure 7.4's 
scenario I of  temporary, but unsustainable, improvement in the debvexport 
ratio. 
The case  for debt  reduction derives  from the  possibility of  benefitting 
debtors and creditors. For a long time, developing country loans have been 
quoted at discounts of more than 50 percent (table 7.1). Banks do not expect 
the loans to be serviced fully, which is why yields are so high and why they 
have added to their loan loss reserves. Creditors could do just  as well  by 
substituting a smaller debt with more secure payment. It makes little sense 
for countries to contradict the market expectation when there is no reward. If 
full  service  translated  into  increased  capital  flows,  there  would  be  that 
incentive. Now,  there is none. There is an open invitation to find reasons to 
reduce debt service. 
Brazil dared  a  unilateral  moratorium on  interest payments  in  February 
1987. It failed because it did not evoke broad political support and because it 
was seen to emanate from domestic policy errors rather than an incapacity to 
pay.  Conversely, the Brazilian decision to  suspend the moratorium and  to 
adopt a less confrontational posture should not be seen as a mistake. In a 
world  where  only  conventional  solutions  were  possible,  it  is  rational  to 
borrow  as much as one can at the lowest spread in  order to alleviate the 
resource  transfer.  Large  short-term  credits  and  interbank  deposits  are 
hostages to fortune that limit Brazilian negotiating strength. 
In 1989 the Brady Plan finally accepted the reality of debt reduction as an 
integral part of debt renegotiation. Mexico concluded an agreement in which 
'zgble 7.1  The Discount in  the Secondary Market for Brazilian Debt 
(cents  per dollar, selling price) 
July  January  July  January  May  July  September 
1985  1986  1986  1987  1981  1987  1987 
Discount  75  75  73  74  64  51  39 
Source:  Salomon Brothers. 359  BrazilIAppendix 
discounts of  35  percent  of  principal or comparable reductions of  interest 
rates were accepted. Equally important, the new money option extends over 
a four-year period. Brazil needs no less. 
Two issues are central.  One  is  the  acceptance by  the  IMF,  the World 
Bank, and the creditor banks of  the simultaneity of  a domestic stabilization 
package and a meaningful debt renegotiation. Our basic message is that the 
success  of  an  adjustment  policy  is  linked  to  reduction  of  the  external 
resource  transfer. The  second  requirement is  the  availability of  adequate 
industrial country support to underwrite an appropriate package.  Like the 
Baker Plan, the Brady Plan is substantially underfunded. 
Better  Brazilian  economic  management  will  be  necessary,  not  only  to 
qualify for debt reduction, but to permit resumption of  sustained economic 
development. Domestic saving will have to increase. Exports will  have to 
receive  continued  priority.  The  public  sector  deficit  will  have  to  be 
controlled. Debt will continue to severely limit the range of the possible, but 
this is no excuse for not trying to make the best of  a difficult situation. 
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